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"CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW .

"*

0. ] ohn Rogget
the last term the Supreme Court in a series of cases had before it questions of the meaning and scope of "the sweeping
command"1 of the First Amendment that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...."
The questions which most of these cases presented in one aspect
or another concerned the problem of the circumstances, if any,
under which speech that has not yet resulted in criminal deeds
can constitutionally be punished, restrained or regulated. Five
cases involved obscenity statutes. These covered the field, on a
federal as well as a state level, in the criminal as well as the civil
area. In Roth v. United States2 the Court sustained the validity
of a federal criminal obscenity statute, and in Alberts v. California8 a state criminal obscenity statute. The Court in an opinion
by Justice Brennan held "that obscenity is not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or press." 4 Justices Black and
Douglas dissented in both cases, and Justice Harlan in the Roth
case. Justice Douglas in his dissent, in which Justice Black concurred, stated: "Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and
to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to
be an inseparable part of it." 5 Justice Harlan dissented on the
ground that the First Amendment's prohibitions placed a greater

A

T

•This article is being published in two instalments.-Ed.
tMember, New York Bar; A.B. 1922, University of Illinois, LL.B. 1925, S.J.D. 1931,
Harvard; formerly (1939-40) United States Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; author, Our Vanishing Civil Liberties
(1949).-Ed.
1 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 at 631 (1919) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Holmes).
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957), affirming (2d Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 796.
a 354 U.S. 476 (1957), affirming 138 Cal. App. (2d) 909, 292 P. (2d) 90 (1955).
4Id. at 485.
l>Id. at 514.
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restriction on federal power than the Fourteenth Amendment's
provision~ "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law," placed on state power.
In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown6 the Court in a five to four
decision upheld a New York statute which provided for civil
non-jury injunctive proceedings against obscene publications.
Justice Frankfurter delivered the Court's opinion. He did not
think that the statute constituted proscribed prior restraint. Justices Douglas and Black thought that it did. Chief Justice Warren
in his dissent stated: "It is the manner of use that should determine obscenity. It is the conduct of the individual that should
he judged, not the quality of art or literature. To do otherwise
is to impose a prior restraint and hence to violate the Constitution. " 7 Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that "the absence in this New York obscenity statute of a right to jury trial
is a fatal defect." 8 In Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of
N ewarkg the Court on the authority of the preceding three cases
in a per curiam decision sustained the validity of a Newark
ordinance which forbade stage performers to expose certain parts
of their bodies and to use profane, lewd or lascivious language.
In the fifth case, Butler v. Michigan,1° the Court unanimously
invalidated. a state statute which made criminal the general sale
or distribution of literature "tending to incite minors." For
otherwise, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, the "incidence"
_o~ such legislation would be "to reduce the adult population ...
to reading only what is fit for children."11
_. ·Six cases involved judgments of conviction under the Smith
Act against leaders of the American Communist Party. Two of
these cases, Scales v. United States12 and Lightfoot v. United
States,13 arose out of prosecutions against individuals under that
provision of the act which makes it a crime to be a member of
an organization that advocates the forcible overthrow of the gov-

6 354 U.S. 436 (1957), affirming I N.Y. (2d) 177, 134 N.E. (2d) 461 (1956), affirming
208 Misc. 150, 142 N.Y.S. (2d) 735 (1955).
7Id. at 446.
s Id. at 447.
9 354 U.S. 931 (1957), affirming 22 N.J. 472, 126 A. (2d) 340 (1956), reversing ll9 N.J.
Super. 111, 120 A. (2d) 496 (1956).
10 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
11 Id. at 383.
12 350 U.S. 992 (1956), granting cert. to (4th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 581.
13 350 U.S. 992 (1956), granting cert. to (7th Cir. 1956) 228 F. (2d) 861.
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ernment, "knowing the purposes thereof." 14 The Court heard
arguments in these two cases but restored them to the docket
for reargument at the 1957 term. 111 The fact that Justices Brennan
and Whittaker were not on the Court when these cases were
argued may help to account for this result.
The remaining four of these six cases arose out of conspiracy
prosecutions. Three, Yates v. United States,16 Schneiderman v.
United States,11 and Richmond v. United States, 18 resulted from
a judgment of conviction against fourteen persons in the Los
Angeles prosecution. The Court reversed, ordering an acquittal
as to five of the defendants and a new trial as to the remaining
nine. Justice Harlan wrote the Court's opinion. Justices Brennan
and Whittaker, who were not members of the Court when these
cases were argued, took no part in their consideration or decision.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in part and dissented in
part: they would have directed the acquittal of all of the defendants. Justice Clark dissented. One of the grounds of the reversal
was the trial judge's refusal to charge, in terms of the trial court's
charge in Dennis v. United States,19 that the advocacy of violent
overthrow "be of a rule or principle of action and by language
reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite persons to such
18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1956) §2385.
353 U.S. 979 (1957). At the 1957 term the Court in each of these two cases announced per curiam: "Upon consideration of the entire record and the confession of
error by the Solicitor General, the judgment •.. is reversed. Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657." 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 3115 (Oct. 14, 1957).
16 354 U.S. 298 (1957), reversing (9th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 146. Yates further received various contempt sentences for refusal to answer questions put to her on crossexamination. On appeal some of these were reversed and some affirmed. Yates v. United
States, (9th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 851, 227 F. (2d) 848, 227 F. (2d) 844. One of those which
was affirmed went to the Supreme Court. 350 U.S. 947 (1956), granting cert. to 227 F.
(2d) 851. The Court heard argument but restored the case ,to the calendar along with
Brown v. United States, 352 U.S. 908 (1956), granting cert. to (6th Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d)
140 (refusal to answer questions on cross-examination in a denaturalization proceeding)
for reargument at the 1957 ,term. 354 U.S. 907 (1957). At the 1957 term the Court, in a
six-to-three decision, sustained the contempt conviction of Yates on one specification but
vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for re-sentencing. 78
S. Ct. 128 (1957).
17 354 U.S. 298. The petitioner in this case was the same as the one in Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), a denaturalization proceeding, in which the Court
in a five-to-three decision, with Justice Murphy writing the majority opinion and Chief
Justice Stone the dissenting one, held that the government had not proved by "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence" that the Communist Party in the five years before
1927 had advocated the overthrow of our government by force and violence. Wendell
L. Willkie, a big business lawyer as well as leader, and Republican presidential candidate
in 1940, successfully represented the petitioner.
1B ll54 U.S. 298.
19 ll41 U.S. 494 (1951).
H
15
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action, all with the intent to cause the overthrow or destruction
of the Government of the United States by force and violence
as speedily as circumstances would permit."20 Instead the trial
judge charged:
"The kind of advocacy and teaching which is charged
and upon which your verdict must be reached is not merely
a desirability but a necessity that the Government of the
United States be overthrown and destroyed by force and violence and not merely a propriety but a duty to overthrow and
destroy the Government of the United States by force and
violence. " 21
The Court felt that this instruction defined advocacy too much
in terms of the teaching of abstract doctrine rather than incitement to illegal action: "The distinction between advocacy of
abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting unlawful
action is one that has been consistently recognized in the opinions
of this Court, beginning with Fox v. Washington . .. and Schenck
v. United States. ..." 22 Justices Black and Douglas dissented on
the same ground as in the Dennis case, that the advocacy provisions of the Smith Act violated the First Amendment. Justice
Black, in an opinion in which Justice Douglas joined, wrote:
"I believe that the First Amendment forbids Congress to punish
people for talking about public affairs, whether or not such discussion incites to action, legal or illegal. " 23 Justice Clark could
not draw the distinctions which the Court did between the charge
in the Dennis case and that in the instant cases: "While there
may be some distinctions between the charges, as I view them
they are without material difference. I find, as the majority intimates, that the distinctions are too 'subtle and difficult to
grasp.' "24
In the sixth Communist case, Wellman v. United States,25
20 Id. at 512.
21354 U.S. at 314-315.
22 Id. at 318.
23 Id. at 340.
24 Id. at 350. Subsequently the district court, on the motion of the government, dis.
missed the indictment as to the nine, and, on its own motion, added a tenth who was not
tried with the others because of illness. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1957, p. 71:4.
25 354 U.S. 931 (1957), vacating judgment in (6th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 757. In a
seventh case, Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. I (1956), reversing (3d Cir. 1955) 223
F. (2d) 449, affirming (W.D. Pa. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 345, involving a judgment of conviction against five persons in the Pittsburgh prosecution, the Court directed the granting
of a new trial after the government advised the Court that it had serious reason to
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arising out of a conspiracy conviction in Detroit, the Court vacated the judgment of affirmance of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, and remanded the case for further consideration
in the light of the Court's decision in the Yates, Schneiderman and
Richmond cases. Again Justice Clark dissented.
One case dealt with a state anti-picketing statute: in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc.,26 the Court in a
five-to-three decision sustained the validity of a Wisconsin statute
which prohibited even peaceful picketing when done for organizational purposes. Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined, urged that
speech when unconnected with conduct should be wholly free:
"I would return to the test enunciated in Giboney-that this form
of expression can be regulated or prohibited only to the extent
that it forms an essential part of a course of conduct which the
State can regulate or prohibit."27
Two additional cases involved contempt sentences of witnesses who refused to answer inquiries put to them by governmental authorities, but who did not invoke the protection of the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. In Watkins v. United States,28 a labor union organizer admitted communist associations but refused to name names. He acknowledged
before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities: "I would like to make it clear that for a period of
time from approximately 1942 to 1947 I cooperated with the
Communist Party and participated in Communist activities to
such a degree that some persons may honestly believe that I was
a member of the party."29 Yet he refused to identify former
communists, saying: ". . . I do not believe that any law in this
country requires me to testify about persons who may in the past

doubt the truthfulness of the testimony of one of its witnesses, Joseph D. Mazzei, who
was a paid informer of the government. The solicitor general disclosed this situation
to the Court in a motion to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Instead the Court ordered a new trial. The petitioner Mesarosh is also known as Nelson,
and was the successful defendant in another case, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956), affirming 377 Pa. 58, 104 A. (2d) 133 (1954), reversing 172 Pa. Super. 125, 92 A.
(2d) 431 (1952), in which the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania sedition law, and cast
doubt on such laws of other states, on the ground that the federal Smith Act pre-empted
the field.
26 354 U.S. 284 (1957),
27 Id. at 297.
28 354 U.S. 178 (1957),
20 354 U.S. at 183.

affirming 270 Wis. 315 at 321a, 74 N.W. (2d) 749 (1956).
reversing (D.C. Cir. 1956) 233 F. (2d) 681.
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have been Communist Party members or otherwise engaged in
Communist Party activity but who to my best knowledge and
belief have long since removed themselves from the Communist
movement."30 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire 31 a socialist who lectured at the University of New Hampshire refused to answer
the inquiries of the attorney general of New Hampshire about
his lecture and about the activities of his wife and others in the
formation of the Progressive Party in that state. The legislature
of New Hampshire by a joint resolution had designated the attorney general as its agent for the investigation of subversive
activities. In both cases the Court upset the sentences. In the
Watkins case it also directed the dismissal of the indictment. Justice Clark dissented in both cases. Justice Burton joined him in
the Sweezy case. In that case Justice Frankfurter in a concurring
opinion quoted from a statement of a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town and the University of the
Witwatersrand. One of the quoted paragraphs reads:
" 'In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a
means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its own
nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of
free inquiry, its ideal being the ideal of Socrates-"to follow
the argument where it leads." This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to the spirit of
a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add
and revise facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to
be ever examining and modifying the framework itself.' " 32
These cases call for a re-examination of the circumstances
leading to the adoption of the federal bill of rights, the framers'
intent in drafting the First Amendment, its subsequent construe30 Id. at 185.
31354 U.S. 234 (1957), reversing 100 N.H. 103, 121 A. {2d) 783 (1956).
32 354 U.S. at 262-263. In a third case, Raley v. Ohio, 354 U.S. 929 (1957), vacating
judgment in 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N.E. (2d) 104 (1956), a witness refused to answer
questions of the Ohio Un-American Activities Committee, but on the basis of the Fifth
Amendment. The Court in a per curiam decision remanded the case for further consideration in the light of the Sweezy and Watkins decisions. At the 1957 term in Uphaus
v. Wyman, 26 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3115 (Oct. 14, 1957), vacating judgment in 100 N.H. 436,
130 A. (2d) 278, the Court remanded the case "for consideration in the light of Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234.'' The petitioner was Willard Uphaus, executive director
of the New Hampshire World Fellowship Center, Inc. Subsequently the New Hampshire
Supreme Court granted a motion to reinstate its original judgment. 136 A. (2d) 221 (1957).
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tion, particularly the development and application of Justice
Holmes' clear and present danger test, which he enuncia,ted in
Schenck v. United States,33 and the respective areas of federal and
state power. It is the position of the writer that, at least so far as
Congress is concerned, speech is as free as thought, and that unless
and until speech becomes a part of a course of conduct which
Congress can restrain or regulate no federal legislative power
over it exists. State power, despite the Fourteenth Amendment,
may be somewhat more extensive. Certainly the framers of the
First Amendment intended that it should be. This article will
deal with federal power over speech.

Founders' Assurances on Freedom
The Constitution originally did not have a bill of rights because the delegates to the federal convention which proposed it
did not feel that one was necessary. They had assembled in order
to meet the need for strengthening the national government.
They did not regard individual rights in danger, certainly not
from that source. Besides, they thought that the states would
protect individual rights. The first recognition of such rights 'by
the Convention was an emendation in the handwriting of John
Rutledge of South Carolina to the report of the Committee of
Detail. This called for a jury trial in criminal cases in the state
where the offense -was committed,34 and became article III, section 2, clause 3. In the closing weeks provisions were added against
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and religious tests for federal
office holders, and for the protection of the writ of habeas corpus.
These are to be found in article I, sections 9 and 10, and article
VI, clause 3. But that was all. Three days before the Convention
adjourned Charles Pinkney of South Carolina, whose -original
draft of a plan for a federal constitution did not contain a bill of
rights,35 and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts_ moved to insert
a declaration "that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably
observed. . . ." Roger Sherman _of Connecticut answered: "It is
unnecessary-The power of Congress does -not extend to the

33 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
34 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 144 (1911). A report written by
Jame~ Wilson of Pennsylvania and edited by Rutledge contained a similar provision.
Id. at 173.
85 See Rtm.AND, THE BmTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 109 (1955).
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Press." The record continues: "On the question, it passed in the
negative."36
However, the absence of a bill of rights became the strongest
objection to the ratification of the Constitution. Its supporters
countered with 'the argument that since the federal government
was one of enumerated powers a bill of rights was unnecessary;
indeed, it might even be dangerous, for it would furnish some
ground for a contention that such an enumeration was exhaustiye.
The earliest and leading protagonist of this double-barreled position was James Wilson of Pennsylvania. In October 1787, less
than a month after the federal convention had adjourned, he
stated to a gathering in Philadelphia:
" ... for it would have been superfluous and absurd, to have
stipulated with a foederal body of our own creation, that we
should enjoy those privileges, of which we are not divested
either by the intention or the act that has brought that body
into existence. For instance, the liberty of the press, which
has been a copious subject of declamation and opposition:
what controul can proceed from the foederal government, to
shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom?
If, indeed, a power similar to that which has heen granted for
the regulation of commerce, had been granted to regulate
literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stipulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate,
as that the impost should be general in its operation...." 37
The next month in the Pennsylvania convention on the ratification of the Constitution he contended:
" ... But in a government consisting of enumerated powers,
such as is proposed for the United States, a bill of rights
would not only be unnecessary, but, in my humble judgment,
highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and
rights which cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of
rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the
powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every thing
that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all
implied power into the scale of the government, and the
rights of the people would be rendered incomplete. On the
other hand, an imperfect enumeration of the powers of gov36 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, rev. ed., 545 (1866).
37 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION, Ford ed., 156

617-618 (1911); 5

(1888).

ELuor, DEBATES
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ernment reserves all implied power to the people; and by
that means the constitution becomes incomplete. But of the
two, it is much safer to run the risk on the side of the con;.
stitution; for an omission in the enumeration of the powers
of government is neither so dangerous nor important as an
omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people."88
The following year Alexander Hamilton of New York in
The Federalist, No. 84, put Wilson's argument in its best-known
form, although the last instalment of this number did not come
from the press until after New York, the eleventh state, had ratified the Constitution. Thus this number had little actual effect
on the political course of events. Hamilton reasoned:
"I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense
and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not
only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would
even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions
to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.
For why declare that things shall not be done which there is
no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power
is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not
contend that such a provision would confer a regulating
power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power.
They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given,
and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the
press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe
proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested
in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of
the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine
of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious
zeal for bills of rights. " 39
Thomas Jefferson, who was then our minister to France, in
a letter of December 20, 1787 from Paris, to his friend James
Madison, answered Wilson's argument:
" ... I will now add what I do not like. First the omission
of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of
88 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
39 At p. 559 (Modern Library ed.).

2d ed., 436-437 (1866).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 56

sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restrictions against monop:.
olies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus
laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the
laws of the land and not by the law of Nations. To say, as
Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government
which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given
which is not reserved might do for the Audience to whom it
was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, opposed by strong
inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from
the omission of the clause of our present confederation which
had declared that in express terms...." 40
Madison at first espoused Wilson's thesis. In the Virginia convention in June 1788 on the ratification of the Constitution he
argued: " ... Can the general government exercise any power not
delegated? If an enumeration be made of our rights, will it not
be implied that everything omitted is given to the general government? Has not the honorable gentleman [Patrick Henry] himself
admitted that an imperfect enumeration is dangerous? . . ." 41
After further debate he took the position that while he was
not ~gainst amendments he was opposed to a bill of rights:
"Mr. MADISON conceived that what defects might be in
the Constitution might be removed by the amendatory mode
in itself. As to a solemn declaration of our essential rights,
he thought it unnecessary and dangerous-unnecessary, because it was evident that the general government had no
power but what was given it, and that the delegation alone
warranted the exercise of power; dangerous, because an
enumeration which is not complete is not ·safe. Such an
· enumeration could not be made, within any compass of time,
40 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Boyd ed., 440 (1955). Article II of the
Articles of Confederation 1778 provided: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."
·
Editors have taken too many liberties with Jefferson. For example, Saul K. Padover
in his THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON (1943) inserts (at 121) after the- words "gratis dictum"
the comment "the reverse of which might just as well be said."
Hart, "Power of Government Over Speech and Press,'' 29 YALE L. J. 410 at 412
(1920), attributes to Jefferson an answer to Hamilton which, while it is in accord with
the-substance of his remarks on a bill of rights in his letters of December 20, 1787 and
March 15, 1789 to Madison, is probably spurious. See Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and
of the Mails,'' 36 MICH. L. REv. 703 at 714, n. 37 (1938). One wonders how many hours
researchers have spent vainly trying to track down the authenticity of materials resulting
from such attempts to improve on history.
_
41 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 2d ed., 620 (1866).
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as would be equal to a general negation, such as his honorable
friend (Mr. Wythe) had proposed. He declared that such
amendments as seemed, in his judgment, to be without danger, he would readily admit, and that he would be the last
to oppose any such amendment as would give satisfaction to
any gentleman, unless it were dangerous." 42
However, on October 17, 1788 he wrote to Jefferson:
" ... My own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of
rights; provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not
meant to be included in the enumeration. At the same time
I have never thought the omission a material defect, nor been
anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment, for any
other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others. I
have favored it because I supposed it might be of use, and
if properly executed could not be of disservice. I have not
viewed it in an important light-I. because I concede that
in a certain degree, though not in the extent argued by Mr.
Wilson, the rights in question are reserved by the manner
in which the federal powers are granted. 2 because there is
great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the
most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite
latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in particular,
if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much
more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power....
3 because the limited powers of the federal Government and
the jealousy of the subordinate Governments, afford a security which has not existed in the case of the State Governments, and exists in no other. . . ." 43
Jefferson in a letter of March 15, 1789 from Paris answered
him. As to his second point he countered: "Half a loaf is better
than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights, let us secure
what we can." And as to his third, that a bill of rights would furnish a text whereby the state governments "will try all the acts
of the federal government." In the beginning of his letter he
stated: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights,
you omit one which has great weight with me, the legal check
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body,
which if rendered independent & kept strictly to their own department merits great confidence for their learning & integrity.''44
42 Id. at 626-627.
43 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 271-272 (1904).
44 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Fed. ed. by Ford, 461-463

(1904).
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Madison, under the impact of his correspondence with his
friend Jefferson and the general demands for a bill of rights,
changed his position, and became the principal draftsman of the
first Ten Amendments. After studying the proposals of the various
states he prepared his own set of amendments, which he laid
before the first Congress in June 1789. In doing so he explained:
"The first of these amendments relates to what may be
called a bill of rights. I will own that I never considered this
provision so essential to the federal constitution, as to make
it improper to ratify it, until such an amendment was added;
at the same time, I always conceived, that in a certain form,
and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. . . .
" ... The people of many States have thought it necessary
to raise barriers against power in all forms and departments
of Government, and I am inclined to believe, if once bills
of rights are established in all the States, as well as the federal
constitution, we shall find that although some of them are
rather unimportant, yet, upon the whole, they will have a
salutary tendency....
"But whatever may be the form which the several States
have adopted in making declarations in favor of particular
rights, the great object in view is to limit and qualify the
powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of
power those cases in which the Government ought not to
act, or to act only in a particular mode....
" ... It has been said, that in the Federal Government
they [declarations of rights] are unnecessary, because the
powers are enumerated, and it follows, that all that are not
granted by the constitution are retained; that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of
the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the Government. I admit that these arguments are not entirely without foundation; but they are not conclusive to the extent
which has been supposed. It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed, they are directed to particular objects; but even if Government keeps within those
limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the
means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, in the
same manner as the powers of the State Governments under
their constitutions may to an indefinite extent; because in the
constitution of the United States, there is a clause granting to
Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested
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in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof; this enables them to fulfil every purpose for which the Government was established. Now, may
not laws be considered necessary and proper by Congress, for
it is for them to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special purposes which they may have in contemplation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary
nor proper; as well as improper laws could be enacted by the
State Legislatures, for fulfilling the more extended objects of
those Governments. I will state an instance, which I think in
point, and proves that this might be the case. The General
Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may not
general warrants be considered necessary for the purpose ... ?"45
In other words in certain areas the federal government was
either not to act at all, or else to act only in a particular manner.
In the instances of freedom of speech and of the press it was not
to act at all. During the course of the debates on his proposals he
pointed out: " ... The right of freedom of speech is secured; the
liberty of the press is expressly declared to be beyond the reach
of this Government...." 46
When he submitted his proposals in June he took occasion
to meet the argument that bills of rights were ineffective: " ... It is
true, there are a few particular States in which some of the most
valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been violated;
but it does not follow but they may have, to a certain degree, a
salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are incorporated
into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
Besides this security there is a great probability that such a declaration in the federal system would be enforced; because the State
Legislatures will jealously and closely watch the operations of
45 I ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Gales comp.. 436-438 (1834~
The portions of the ANNALS relating to the First Ten Amendments in the first Congress
are reprinted in PATIERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 93-217 (1955).
46 I ANNALS at 738.
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this Government, and be able to resist with more effect every
assumption of power, than any other power on earth can do; and
the greatest opponents to a Federal Government admit the State
Legislatures to be sure guardians of the people's liberty... .''47
"Here," in the words of Irving Brant, "was not only the doctrine
of judicial review but the lusty germ of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions ...." 48

Framers' Intent
By the unqualified prohibitions of the First Amendment the
framers intended to accomplish a double purpose: they "sought,"
in the words of Professor Zechariah Chafee, "to preserve the
fruits of the old victory abolishing the censorship, and to achieve
a new victory abolishing sedition prosecutions. " 49 The struggle
against censorship, against prior restraint, had been won in
England in 1695 when the House of Commons declined to extend the then existing licensing law, which expired in that year.
The House of Lords voted for renewal but, when the Commons
insisted, acquiesced. One would like to feel that Milton's Areopagitica contributed to this result. According to Macaulay, however,
the end of licensing was due to the petty grievances involved in
enforcing it.50
But prosecutions for seditious libel remained. Blackstone
explained in his Commentaries (1769):
" ... The liberty of the press is, indeed, essential to the nature
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press;
but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal,
he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subffliU~

.

267 (1950). All of Jefferson's
private letters came by diplomatic pouch, so that his letter of March 15, 1789 probably
48 BRANT, JAMES MADISON FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION

,

reached Madison before the latter presented his proposed amendments to the House
on June 8, 1789. See Cahn, "The Firstness of the First Amendment," 65 YALE L. J.
464 at 467, n. 12 (1956).
49 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1941).
50 6 THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, new ed., 360-373, 7 id. at 168-169 (1897). See also
Emerson, "The Doctrine of Prior Restraint," 20 LAw & CoNTEM• .PROB. 648 at 650-651
(1955). In the colonies licensing came to an end by 1725. See DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS 89, n. 2 (1906).
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ject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was
formerly done, both before and since the revolution, is to
subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one
man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all
controverted points in learning, religion, and government.
But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall, on a fair
and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is
necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of
government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil
liberty. . . ." 51
Thus the crown found such prosecutions a fairly good substitute for the old censorship.
Blackstone explained, too, the theory underlying these prosecutions:
". . . The direct tendency of these libels is the breach of
the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed. The communication of a
libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law;
and, therefore, the sending an abusive private letter to a man
is as much a libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally
tends to a breach of the peace. For the same reason, it is immaterial, with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the
matter of it be true or false; since the provocation, and not
the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally; though,
doubtless, the falsehood of it may aggravate its guilt and enhance its punishment. In a civil action, we may remember, a
libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; for, if the
charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury,
and has no ground to demand a compensation for himself,
whatever offense it may be against the public peace; and,
therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may
be pleaded in bar of the suit. But, in a criminal prosecution,
the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and
to disturb the public peace, is the whole that the law considers...."52

51 Vol. 4 at •!51-152.
52 4 id. at •150-151. Coke

in De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250
at 251 (1606), explained: "Every libel . • • is made either against a private man, or
against a magistrate or public person. If it be against a private man it deserves a severe
punishment, for although tbe libel be made against one, yet it incites all those of tbe
same family, kindred, or society to revenge, and so tends per consequens to quarrels
and breach of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of blood and of great inconvenience: if it be against a magistrate, or other public person, it is a greater offence;
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Hence arose the explanation in criminal libel prosecut10ns as
distinct from civil suits for libel that "the greater the truth the
greater the libel." 53
One's position on the crime of seditious libel depended on
one's view of the nature of the relationship between those in
positions of governmental authority and the people. In England,
despite the victory over censorship in 1695, the people generally
continued to regard the rulers as their superiors who could not
be subjected to any censure that would tend to diminish their
authority. The people could not criticize them directly in newspapers or pamphlets, but only through their lawful representatives in parliament, who might be petitioned in an orderly
manner.154
But the framers of the First Amendment regarded those in
positions of governmental authority as the servants of the people.
Accordingly the people might find fault with them as they saw
fit, as well as discuss freely questions of governmental policy. As
Madison explained in the Third Congress, "If we advert to the
nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in
the Government over the people." 55 Under this view the crime

for it concerns not only the breach of the peace, but also the scandal of Government;
for what greater scandal of Government can there be than to have corrupt or wicked
magistrates to be appointed and constituted by the King to govern his subjects under
him? •••" Stephen calls this "the nearest approach to a definition of the crime with
which I am acquainted." 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 348 (1883). He
also comments (at 304) that "even in Coke it would be difficult to find anything less
satisfactory."
53 See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 499-500 (1941); Schofield, "Freedom
of the Press in the United States," in 2 EssAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 510
at 516 (1921).
54 See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 8-22 (1941); 8 HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 336-346 (1926); 2 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 299-300 (1883); SMITH, FREEDOM'S FEITERS 146, 418-421 (1956); Schofield,
"Freedom of the Press in the United States," in 2 EssAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
EQUITY 520-521 (1921).
55 ANNALS 934, 3d Cong., 2d sess. (Nov. 27, 1794). See also, e.g., the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), written by George Mason, which provided in the second paragraph:
"That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates
are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them."
Most of the states had comparable provisions. GA. CONST., preamble (1777); Mo.
CONST., Declaration of Rights, §1 (1776); MASS. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. V
(1780); N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, art. VIII (1784); N.C. CONST., Declaration of Rights,
§1 (1776); PA. CONST., Declaration of Rights, §4 (1776); S.C. CONST., art. IX, §1 (1790);
VT. CONST., Declaration of Rights, ch. I, §5 (1777), CONST. Declaration of Rights, ch. I,
§6 (1786).
When the Federal Convention of 1787 took up the manner of choosing the chief
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of seditious libel was a thing of the past. Sir James Fitzjames
Stephen pointed out in his History of the Criminal Law of England: "To those who hold this view fully and carry it out to all
its consequences there can be no such offense as sedition. There
may indeed be breaches of the peace which may destroy or endanger life, limb, or property, and there may be incitements
to such offenses, but no imaginable censure of the government,
short of a censure which has an immediate tendency to produce
such a breach of the peace, ought to be regarded as criminal." 56
It was this view which was embodied in the unqualified prohibitions of the First Amendment.
A few years after its adoption when Talleyrand, the French
foreign minister, complained to the American envoys Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall and Elbridge Gerry about
the insults and calumnies in the American press against the
French Government, they replied in a memorial drafted by
Marshall:
"The genius of the Constitution, and the opinions of the
people of the United States, cannot be overruled by those
who administer the Government. Among those principles
deemed sacred in America; among those sacred rights considered as forming the bulwark of their liberty, which the
Government contemplates with awful reverence, and would
approach only with the most cautious circumspection, there
is no one of which the importance is more deeply impressed
on the public mind than the liberty of the press. That this
liberty is often carried to excess, that it has sometimes degenerated into licentiousness, is seen and lamented; but the
remedy has not yet been discovered. Perhaps it is an evil
inseparable from the good with which it is allied: perhaps
it is a shoot which cannot be stripped from the stalk, without wounding vitally the plant from which it is torn. Howexecutive, Mason made this point in converse fashion: " . . • Having for his primary
object, for the pole star of his political conduct, the preservation of the rights of the
people, he held it as an essential point, as ·the very palladium of Civil liberty, that the
great officers of State, and particularly the Executive should at fixed periods return to
that mass from which they -were at first taken, in order that they may feel &: respect
those rights &: interests, Which are again to be personally valuable to them. . • ."
2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 119-120 (1911). Madison in the proposed
amendments which he put before the first Congress borrowed from the second paragraph
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. In his first amendment he proposed: "That there
be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all power is orginally vested in, and
consequently derived from, the people." I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (1789).
L6 Vol. 2 at 300 (1883).
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ever desirable those measures might be which might correct
without enslaving the press, they have never yet been devised
in America. No regulations exist which enable the Government to suppress whatever calumnies or invectives any individual may choose to offer to the public eye; or to punish
such calumnies and invectives, otherwise than by a legal
prosecution in courts which are alike open to all who consider themselves as injured. " 57

Sedition Act of 1798
In Dennis v. United. States 58 Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson,
in an opinion in which Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton joined,
commented: "No important case involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919)." 59 However, there were two prior great occasions when
the scope of the First Amendment's proscriptions against any
law abridging freedom of speech and of the press were thoroughly
debated, and a conclusion finally and generally reached against
any exceptions: at the time of the Sedition Act of 1798; 60 and
after President Andrew Jackson in December 1835 proposed to
Congress the passage of a law which would prohibit the use of
the mails for "incendiary publications intended to instigate the
slaves to insurrection." 61
The Sedition Act of 1798 was passed during the course of
what President John Adams later called "the half War with
France." 62 This act made it a penal offense to publish any false,
scandalous and malicious writings against the government, the
president or either house of Congress with the intent to bring
them into disrepute or stir up hatred against them. However,
the act entrusted the determination of criminality to the jury,
thus adopting the reform embodied in Fox's Libel Act63 in England, and in addition allowed truth as a defense.
117 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 191 at 196 (1832). See also 2 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 329-330 (1919).
58 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
59 Id. at 503.
60 I STAT. 596, July 14, 1798.
61 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st sess., p. 10 (1836). See also 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE ,PRESIDENTS, Richardson ed., 147, 176 (1896).
62 Letter of September 30, 1805 to Benjamin Rush. OLD FAMILY LETIER.5: COPIED
FROM THE ORIGINALS FOR ALEXANDER BIDDLE, Series A, 78, 84 (1892).
63 32 Geo. 3, c. 60 (1792): " .•• on every such trial, the jury sworn to try the issue
may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue •••
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The focal points of the opposition to this act were the Virginia
Resolutions, drafted by Madison, and the Kentucky Resolutions,
the first of which were drafted by Jefferson and the second of
which may have been. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 declared that the act "is not law, but is altogether void, and of no
force" because it violated the First and Tenth Amendments: the
First in "that libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally· with
heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of
federal tribunals." 64
_ Kentucky concluded with the resolve "that it does also believe,
that, to take from the states all the powers of self-government, and
transfer them to a general and consolidated government, without
regard to the special government, and reservations solemnly
agreed to in that compact, is not for the peace, happiness, or
prosperity of these states; and that, therefore, this commonwealth
is determined, as it doubts not its co-states are, to submit to undelegated and consequently unlimited powers in no man, or body
of men, on earth...." 65
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 added, " ... That, if those
who administer the general government be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by that compact, by a total disregard to
the special delegations of power therein contained, an annihilation of the state governments, and the creation, upon their ruins,
of a general consolidated government,· will be the inevitable
consequence ... ," 66 and suggested as a rightful remedy a nullification by the states.
Madison prepared not only the Virginia Resolutions but
also an Address of the General Assembly to the People of the
Commonwealth of Virginia to accompany those of 1798, and a
Report which contained a point by point defense of them. He
drew up the Report because the replies of the various states to
the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 were generally
unfavorable. In the Address he quoted from the reply which
Marshall drafted for himself and his fellow envoys to Talleyrand.

and shall not be required or directed, by the court or judge . . . to find the defendant... guilty, merely on the proof of the publication by such defendant .•. of the paper
charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment or in-formation."
64 4
65 4
66 4

Eu.xoT, DEBATES
id. at 542-543.
id. at 545.

ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

2d ed., 541 (1866).
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He further explained that steps had already been taken which
might lead to a consolidated government, standing armies and
even a form of monarchy: " ... They consist- .. ·. In destroying,
by the sedition act, the responsibility of public servants and public
measures to the people, thus retrograding towards the exploded
doctrine 'that the administrators of the Government are the masters, and not the servants, of the people,' and exposing America,
which acquired the honour of taking the lead among nations
towards perfecting political principles, to the disgrace of returning first to ancient ignorance and barbarism." 67
In the Report Madison assailed the two arguments which the
Federalists advanced in support of the act: that Congress had
power to punish crimes under the common law of England; and
that the First Amendment in prohibiting Congress from making
any law impairing freedom of the press had created a power to
punish the licentiousness of the press. He took the contention
that under the express power of Congress to "suppress Insurrections"68 one could "imply the power to prevent insurrections, by
punishing whatever may lead or tend to them,'' and in answer
suggested that if libels tended to insurrections then the thing to
do was to pass and execute laws for the suppression of insurrections:
" ... But it surely cannot, with the least plausibility, be said,
that the regulation of the press, and a punishment of libels,
are exercises of a power to suppress insurrections. The most
that could be said would be that the punishment of libels,
if it had the tendency ascribed to it, might prevent the occasion of passing or executing laws necessary and proper for
the suppression of insurrections.
". . . for if the power to suppress insurrections includes
a power to punish libels, or if the power to punish includes
a power to prevent, by all the means that may have that
tendency, such is the relation and influence among the most

67 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 339 (1906). A little over a decade
after Madison in his Report cut the ground from under the argument that Congress
had power to punish crime under the common law of England, the Supreme Court so
ruled in a case which involved an indictment for a libel on the President and the Congress. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 31 (1812). The Court specifically stated
(at 32), "Although this question is brought up now, for the first time, to be decided by
this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no
-0ther case, for many years, has this jurisdiction been asserted; and -the general acquiescence
<>f legal men shows the prevalence of opinion in favor of the negative of the proposition."
68 U.S. CONST,, art. I, §8, cl. 15.
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remote subjects of legislation, that a power over a very few
would carry with it a power over all. And it must be wholly
immaterial whether unlimited powers be exercised under
the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised under the
name of unlimited means of carrying into execution limited
powers." 69
He explained at length that the First Amendment's prohibition included not only the Blackstonian concept of previous restraint but subsequent punishment as well: it included any law.
In this country the people were the masters, not the government,
and hence had a greater freedom of animadversion. Especially
in the case of the press the bad had to be taken with the good:
"The freedom of the press under the common law is,
in the defens es of the Sedition Act, made to consist in an
exemption from all previous restraint on printed publications by persons authorized to inspect and prohibit them.
It appears to the committee that this idea of the freedom of
the press can never be admitted to be the American idea of
it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications
would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous
restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say that no
laws should be passed preventing publications from being
made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in
case they should be made.
"The essential difference between the British Government and the American Constitutions will place this subject
in the clearest light.
"In the British Government the danger of encroachments
on the rights of the people is understood to be confined to
the executive magistrate. The representatives of the people
in the Legislature are not only exempt themselves from distrust, but are considered as sufficient guardians of the rights
of their constituents against the danger from the Executive.
Hence it is a principle, that the Parliament is unlimited in its
power; or, in their own language, is omnipotent. Hence,
too, all the ramparts for protecting the rights of the peoplesuch as their Magna Charta, their Bill of Rights, etc.-are
not reared against the Parliament, but against the royal prerogative. They are merely legislative precautions against
executive usurpations. Under such a Government as this, an

6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 383-384 (1906); 4
FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION, 2d ed., 568 (1866).
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exemption of the press from previous restraint, by licensers
appointed by the King, is all the freedom that can be secured
to it.
"In the United States the case is all together different.
The People, not the Government, possess the absolute sovereignty. The Legislature, no less than the Executive, is
under limitations of power. Encroachments are regarded as
possible from the one as well as from the other. Hence, in the
United States the great and essential rights of the people are
secured against legislative as well as against executive ambition. They are secured, not by laws paramount to prerogative,
but by constitutions paramount to laws. This security of the
freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to
be effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous
inspection of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of
laws.
"The state of the press, therefore, under the common
law, cannot, in this point of view, be the standard of its
freedom in the United States. . . .
'
"The nature of governments elective, limited, and responsible in all their branches, may well be supposed to require a greater freedom of animadversion than might be
tolerated by the genius of such a government as that of Great
Britain... .
" ... Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper
use of every thing, and in no instance is this more true than
in that of the press. It has accordingly been decided by the
practice of the States, that it is better to leave a few of its
noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the
proper fruits. And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted
by any who _reflect that to the press alone, chequered as it
is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs
which have been gained by reason and humanity over error
and oppression; who reflect that to the same beneficent source
the United States owe much of the lights which conducted
them to the ranks of a free and independent nation, and
which have improved their political system into a shape so
auspicious to their happiness? ... The article of amendment,
instead of supposing in Congress a power that might be
exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not
abridged, was meant as a positive denial to Congress of any
po:wer whatever on the subject....
"Is, then, the Federal Government, it will be asked, des-
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titute of every authority for restraining the licentiousness of
the press, and for shielding itself against the libelous attacks
which may be made on those who administer it?
"The Constitution alone can answer this question. If
no such power be expressly delegated, and if it be not both
necessary and proper to carry into execution an express
power-above all, if it be expressly forbidden, by a declaratory amendment to the Constitution-the answer must be,
that the Federal Government is destitute of all such authority.
". . . The peculiar magnitude of some of the powers
necessarily committed to the Federal Government; the pe,culiar duration required for the functions of some of its departments; the peculiar distance of the seat of its proceedings from
the great body of its constituents; and the peculiar difficulty
of circulating an adequate knowledge of them through any
other channel; will not these considerations, some or other of
which produced other exceptions from the powers of ordinary
governments, all together, account for the policy of binding
the hand of the Federal Government from touching the channel which alone can give efficacy to its responsibility to its
constituents, and of leaving those who administer it to a
remedy, for their injured reputations, under the same laws,
and in the same tribunals, which protect their lives, their
liberties, and their properties?" 70
On the floor of Congress John Nicholas of Virginia pointed
out the fallacy of the bad tendency doctrine and the danger in
the position which gave Congress the power to punish other
than acts. The occasion was the debate on the report of a select
committee on petitions praying for a repeal of the alien and
sedition laws. Nicholas cautioned:
"The suggestion on which the authority over the press
is founded, is, that seditious writings have a tendency to produce opposition to Government. What has a greater tendency to fit men for insurrection and resistance to Government, than dissolute, immoral habits, at once destroying love
of order, and dissipating the fortune which gives an interest
in society?
"The doctrine that Congress can punish any act which
has a tendency to hinder the execution of the laws, as well as
acts which do hinder it, will, therefore, clearly entitle them

70 6

id. (Madison) at 386-390, 392-393; 4 id. (Elliot} at 569-573.
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to assume a general guardianship over the morals of the people of the United States." 71
Such a result was of course contrary to anything this country's
founders had in mind.
The best contemporary estimate of the Sedition Act of 1798
came from John Taylor of Caroline:
" ... The design of substituting political for religious heresy, is visible in the visage of sedition laws. A civil priesthood or
government, hunting after political heresy, is an humble
imitator of the inquisition, which fines, imprisons, tortures
and murders, sometimes mind, at others, body. It affects the
same piety, feigned by priestcraft at the burning of an heretick; and its party supplies such exultations, as those exhibited at an auto da fe, by a populace. . . ." 72
The Federalists, although they used this act against their
opponents, nevertheless lost the election of 1800; but it is impossible to say that the act contributed appreciably to the result.
However, the attempt of the Federalists to renew the act in the
closing days of the Adams administration failed, and the act
expired by its own terms on March 3, 1801. The next day Jefferson declared in his first inaugural address:
"If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undis711! ANNALS OF CONGRESS 3004-3005 (1799). Contemporary views support Professor
Henry Schofield's conclusion: " .•• One of the objects of the Revolution was to get
rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press.••• [T)he crime of
sedition and liberty of the press as declared in the First Amendment cannot co-exist. . ••"
"Freedom of the Press in the United States," in 2 ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw AND
EQUITY 521-522, 536 (1921).
Cooley wrote: " ... the mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is
secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered orally there
can .be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery
and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword, if, while every man was at liberty to
publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for
harmless publications .•.. [T]heir [free speech guaranties] purpose has evidently been
to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their
right to a· free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every
citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of
public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority
which the people have conferred upon them.•.• The evils to be prevented were not
the censorship of the press merely, ,but any action of the government by means of which
it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely
essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens." 2
COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., Carrington, 885-886 (1927).
72 AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 437 (1950).
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turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. I
know, indeed, that some honest men fear that a republican
government can not be strong, that this Government is not
strong enough; but would the honest patriot, in the full tide
of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so
far kept us free and firm on the theoretic and visionary fear
that this Government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this,
on the contrary, the strongest Government on earth. I believe
it the only one where every man, at the call of the law,
would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet
invasions of the public order as his own personal concern. Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted
with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted
with the government of others? Or have we found angels in
the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this
question." 73
The general opinion, at least until the cold war period, has
been that the Sedition Act of 1798 violated the First Amendment.
After he became president, Jefferson pardoned all prisoners who
were convicted under it and Congress eventually repaid all fines.
Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States,7'1 in which Justice Brandeis joined, wrote: " ... I wholly
disagree with the argument of the Government that the First
Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force.
History seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that
the United States through many years had shown its repentance
for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed." 76
President Woodrow Wilson concluded that the act "cut perilously
near the root of freedom of speech and of the press." 76

73 1 MESSAGES AND .pAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, Richardson ed., 322 (1897). A select
bibliography on the Sedition Act of 1798 will include, in addition to the writings of
Madison and Jefferson: BRANT, JAMES MADISON FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION (1950); KoCH,
JEFFERSON AND MADISON (1950); SCHACHNRR, THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1954); SMITH, FREE•
DOM'S FETIERS (1956); Carroll, "Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist
Period; The Sedition Act," 18 MICH. L. REv. 615 (1920); Schofield, "Freedom of the
Press in the United States," in 2 EssAYS ON CoNsrrrUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 510 (1921).
7¼ 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
75 Id. at 630. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in Beauhamais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952), commented (at 289): " ••• I think today's better opinion regards the
enactment as a breach of the First Amendment and certainly Mr. Justice Holmes and
Mr. Justice Brandeis thought so."
76 6 A HlsrOllY OF THE AMRRICAN PEOPLE, documentary ed., 39 (1918).
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"Incendiary Publications"
The second great occasion which called for a full discussion
of the scope of the First Amendment was President Jackson's
proposal for barring the use of the mails to what were then
called "incendiary publications." The Senate referred President
Jackson's proposal to a Special Committee with John C. Calhoun
of South Carolina as Chairman and two Southern and two Northern members-the Senate Committee on the Post Office and Post
Roads had but one Southern member. The Special Committee,
despite its majority of Southern members, despite the vehemence
of Northern anti-slavery agitation and the dissemination from the
North of a volume of abolitionist literature throughout the
South, and despite Calhoun's bitter antagonism to abolitionist
literature and his intense desire for the enactment of some measure to avoid the horrible insurrection which he feared those
activities were engendering, reported adversely on President
Jackson's proposal on the ground that the First Amendment forbade any such measure. In support of its conclusions the Committee cited Madison's Report on the Sedition Act of 1798. The
Committee stated:
". . . while they agree . . . as to the evil and its highly
dangerous tendency, and the necessity of arresting it, they
have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which
he recommends.
"After the most careful and deliberate investigation they
have been constrained to adopt the conclusion that Congress
has not the power to pass such a law....
"In the discussion on the point, the Committee do not
deem it necessary to inquire whether the right to pass such
a law can_ be derived from the power to establish post offices
and post roads, or from the trust 'of preserving the relation
created by the constitution between the States,' as supposed
by the President. However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be to derive the right from these, or any other
sources, they must fall short of their object. The jealous
spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors at the period when the constitution was adopted, forever closed the
door by which the right might be implied from any of the
granted powers, or any other source, if there be any other.
The committee refer to the amended article of the constitution which, among other things, provides that Congress shall
pass no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press-a
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prov1s1on which interposes, as will be hereafter shown, an
insuperable objection to the measure recommended by the
President. . . ."
"That it was the object of this provision to place the
freedom of the press beyond the possible interference of
Congress, is a doctrine not now advanced for the first time.
It is the ground taken, and so ably sustained by Mr. Madison,
in his celebrated report to the Virginia Legislature, in 1799,
against the alien and sedition law, and which conclusively
settled the principle that Congress has no right, in any form,
or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of the press.
The establishment of this principle not only overthrew the
sedition act, but was the cause of the great political revolution which, in 1801, brought the republican party, with Mr.
Jefferson at its head, into power. . . .
" ... Nothing is more clear than that the admission of the
right, on the part of Congress, to determining what papers
are incendiary, and as such to prohibit their circulation
through the mail, necessarily involves the right to determine
what are not incendiary, and to enforce their circulation....
It would give Congress, without regard to the prohibition
laws of the States, the authority to open the gates to the flood
of incendiary publications which are ready to break into
those States, and to punish all who dare resist as criminals.
Fortunately, Congress has no such right. . . ." 77
However, Calhoun as chairman prepared a bill which in its
first section, as amended, made it unlawful "for any deputy postmaster, in any State, Territory, or District of the United States,
knowingly to deliver to any person whatever, any pamphlet,
newspaper, handbill, or other printed matter or pictorial representation touching the subject of slavery, where, by the laws of
the said State, Territory, or District, their circulation is prohibit77 S. Rep. ll8, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 1-5 (1836). The report is also set out in 49 NILES'
WEEKLY REGISTER 408 (1836). The committee's observation that the struggle over the
Sedition Act of 1798 caused a great political revolution which brought the Republican
(Democratic) party into power is an overstatement. Schachner has pointed out:
"Geographical divisions-the South against the North, with the Middle States wavering uneasily in between-were far more potent influences; and had not changed since the
preceding election or even the beginning of the nation. These were the same divisions
that were to culminate in the great Civil War, and were bottomed on the same essential
conflicts. Nor did the Alien and Sedition Acts contribute appreciably to the resultanother common claim that must •be dismissed. There is no evidence that any votes were
shifted from one party to another because of them. Those who opposed the Acts had
been Republicans before, and continued to be so. Jefferson had failed of election four
years before by a hairsbreadth without their aid and benefit." ScHACHNER, THE FOUNDING
FATHERS 549 (1954).
.
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ed; and any deputy postmaster who shall be guilty thereof, shall
be forthwith removed from oflice." 78 The Calhoun bill was likewise defeated: the vote against it was 25 to 19.79 In opposing
Calhoun's bill Senator John Davis of Massachusetts reminded his
colleagues: "The liberty of the press was not like the other reserved rights, reserved by implication, but was reserved in express terms; it could not be touched in any manner." 80 He had
this further comment, which is even more pertinent today than
when it was uttered: "The public morals were said to be in
danger; it was necessary to prevent licentiousness, tumult, and
sedition; and the public good required that the licentiousness
should be restrained. All these were the plausible pretences under which the freedom of the press had been violated in all
ages .... "81
Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky considered this bill "unconstitutional; and if not so, that it contained a principle of a most
dangerous and alarming character. . . . After much reflection he
had come to the conclusion that they could not pass any law interfering with the subject in any shape or form whatsoever....
The States alone had the power, and their power was ample for
the purpose .... [T]he bill was calculated to destroy all the landmarks of the constit,ution, establish a precedent for dangerous
legislation, and to lead to incalculable mischief.... " 8 :►•
Finally Daniel Webster, whose influence on the early development of our constitutional principles was second only to that
of Chief Justice Marshall, vehemently attacked the measure. He
declared that the freedom of the press included "the liberty of
printing as well as the liberty of publishing, in all the ordinary
modes of publication; and was not the circulation of papers
through the mails an ordinary mode of publication?" Further:
"Now against the objects of this bill he had not a word to say;
but with constitutional lawyers there was a great difference between the object and the means to carry it into effect.... Congress

78 CONG.
79 Id. at

GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st sess. 437 (1836).
442; 12 CONG. DEBATES, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 1737 (1836).
80 CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st sess. 299 (1836). During the course of the debates
Calhoun pointed out that "if they once acknowledged the power of Congress to suppress
the transmission of these incendiary papers directly, and to say what was incendiary, it
would be conceding to it to decide what was not incendiary, as they were in their nature
correlative rights. • • ." Id. at 298.
81 CONG. GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st sess., 439 (1836).
82Ibid.
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had not the power, drawn from the character of the paper, to
decide whether it should be carried in the mail or not; for such
decision would be a direct abridgment of the freedom of the
press. He confessed that he was shocked at the doctrine. He looked
back to the alien and sedition laws which were so universally
condemned throughout the country. . . . " 83
Meanwhile the House Committee on the Post Office and
Post Roads brought in a bill which took an opposite position
to that in Calhoun's bill: the House Committee's bill, as finally
enacted, made it a penal offense if any postmaster should "unlawfully detain in his office any letter, package, pamphlet, or
newspaper, with intent to prevent the arrival and delivery of the
same to the person or persons to whom such letter, package,
pamphlet or newspaper may be addressed or directed. . . . " 84
The House passed the bill in June. The Senate, after defeating
Calhoun's bill, accepted the House bill, with a few minor changes;
and in July the two houses were brought into agreement. This
act in principle prohibited the post office department from censoring the mail: its job was simply that of carrying it. Years later
Judge Thurman W. Arnold in the concluding paragraph of his
opinion in the Esquire 85 case aptly stated:
"We believe that the Post Office officials should experience a feeling of relief if they are limited to the more prosaic
function of seeing to it that 'neither snow nor rain nor heat
nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.' " 86
The Supreme Court in Ex parte ]ackson 81 in an opinion by
Justice Field, in the course of a review of the proceedings in the
Senate on President Jackson's proposal and Calhoun's bill, commented:
" ... In the Senate, that portion of the message was referred
to a select committee, of which Mr. Calhoun was chairman;
83 Id. at 437, 440. These debates are also reported in 12 CONG. DEBATES, 24th Cong.,
1st sess., 1722-1737 (1836). For other accounts of this important incident in our history
see 6 MCMASTER, HisrORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 288-291 (1883); NYE,
FETIERED FREEDOM 60-65 (1949); Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and of the Mails," 36
MICH. L. REv. 703 at 717-723 (1938).
84 Act of July 2, 1836, §32, 5 Stat. 87.
8G Esquire v. Hannegan, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 49, affd. sub nom. Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
86 Id. at 55.
87 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
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and he made an elaborate report on the subject, in which he
contended that it belonged to the States, and not to Congress,
to determine what is and what is not calculated to disturb
their security, and· that to hold otherwise would be fatal to
the States; for if Congress might determine what papers were
incendiary, and as such prohibit their circulation through
the mails, it might also determine wh~t were not incendiary,
and enforce their circulation." 88
Two days before President Jackson made his proposal the
Richmond Compiler set forth the First Amendment together
with comparable provisions from state constitutions with this
introduction: "The following are extracts from the constitutions
of the United States and the several states of the union, from
which it will be seen that no law can constitutionally be passed
for the purpose of restraining the fanatics of the north in their
crusade against our rights." 89
Thus on two great occasions prior to Schenck v. United

88 Id. at 734.
89 49 NILES'

WEEKLY REGISTER 236 (1835). Of course the Southern states by local
measures tried to prevent the distribution of abolitionist literature. Nye wrote: "Failure
to control the distribution of abolitionist literature by federal legislation did not mean,
however, that the mails were thrown open at once to the antislavery presses. Southern
States which did not already have laws governing the publication and circulation of
'incendiary' matter quickly passed them, and other states strengthened existing legislation.
South Carolina depended upon its law of 1820, and Kentucky upon laws passed in 1799
and 1831. North Carolina had passed similar legislation in 1830, Louisiana and Mississippi
in 1831, and Alabama in 1832 and 1835. Maryland's law of 1835 sufficed for a time; Missouri enacted legislation of the usual type in 1837; and Georgia relied upon local legislation. Virginia, in 1836, passed a law requiring postmasters to notify justices of the peace
whenever they received 'incendiary' publications in their offices; that officer would then
judge their offensiveness, burn them publicly if they violated the law, and arrest the
addressee if he had subscribed to them with the aim of assisting an abolition society.
ThroughotJt the years to 1861 the Southern states reaffirmed and strengthened their laws,
adding new interpretations and closing loopholes. • • •
"In general the Southern interpretation of the federal mails law of 1836 held that
state laws, governing the reception and distribution of 'incendiary' matter through the
post office, were supreme. Virginia's Attorney General Tucker summarized the Southern
view, stating that the federal power over the mails ceased when the mails reached their
destination; 'At that point, the power of the State becomes exclusive. Whether the
citizens shall receive the mail matter, is a question exclusively for her determination.'
Since most Southern states had statutes requiring inspection of the mails by the postmaster or local authorities, the federal law was effectively nullified. In the Yazoo case of
1857 United States Attorney General Cushing gave this interpretation official sanction
when he ruled that a Mississippi statute forbidding delivery of 'incendiary' matter was
not in conflict with the federal law of 1836, and that no postmaster was required to
deliver materials 'the design and tendency of which are to promote insurrections.' Similarly, Postmaster General Holt in 1859 ruled that the Virginia statute of 1836 did not conflict with federal law. To the postmaster at Falls Church, Virginia, he wrote that any
postmaster might, after inspection of the mails, withhold delivery of any matter of
'incendiary character.' 'The people of Virginia,' he said, 'may not only forbid the in•
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States90 this country's leaders refused to read exceptions into
the First Amendment's unqualified prohibitions. On the first
occasion, at the time of the Sedition Act of 1798, those leaders
included the framers of the first ten amendments. On the second
occasion, at the time of President Jackson's proposal of December
1835, those leaders included men who were already past their
early childhood when the first ten amendments were adopted.
It would be difficult to suggest more authoritative interpretations.
Deeds Not Words
Madison's criticism in his Report of the bad tendency doctrine and his suggestion that federal power was limited to acts
and could not apply to speech alone, Jefferson had made earlier
and in a more direct and even stronger fashion. In his draft of
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which he introduced
into the Virginia Assembly in 1779, and which passed that bod_y
in 1785, he stated: " ... that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill
tendency is a dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious
liberty, because he being of course judge of that tendency will
make his opinions the rule of judgment, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or
differ from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order...." 01
And before Jefferson drafted this bill the Rev. Philip
Furneaux, a dissenting divine, in one of a series of famous letter.s
to Blackstone, which were published in book form in London in
1770, and in Philadelphia three years later, had eloquently
urged the same approach:
"If it be objected, that when the tendency of principles
is unfavourable to the peace and good order of society, as
troduction and dissemination of such documents within their borders, but, if brought
-there in the mails, they may, by appropriate legal proceedings have them destroyed.,...
NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM 65-66, 68-69 (1949). See also Deutsch, "Freedom of the Press and
of the Mails," 36 MICH. L. REv. 703 at 719-725 (1938).
90 249 U.S.

47 (1919).
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Boyd ed., 546 (1950); 12 LAWS
84 at 85 (Hening, 1823).
912
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it may.be, it is the magistrate's duty then, and for that reason,
to restrain them by penal laws: I reply, that the tendency of
principles, though it be unfavourable, is not prejudicial to
society, till it: issues in some overt acts against the publick
peace and order; and when it does, then the magistrate's
authority to punish commences; that is, he may punish the
·overt acts, but not the tendency, which is not actually hurtful; and, therefore, his penal laws should be directed against
overt acts" only, which are detrimental to the peace and good
order of society, let them spring from what principle they
will; and not against principles, or the tendency of principles.
"The distinction between the tendency of principles, and
the overt acts arising from them, is, and cannot but be, observeq, in many cases of a civil nature; in order to determine
the bounds of the magistrate's power, or at least to limit the
exercise of it, in such cases. It would not be difficult to mentiqn customs and manners, as well as principles, which have
a tendency unfavourable to society, and which, nevertheless,
cannot be restrained by penal laws, except with the total
destruction of civil liberty. And here, the magistrate must be
~ontented with pointing his penal laws against the evil overt
acts resulting from them. . . . Punishing a man for the tendency of his principles, is punishing him before he is guilty,
for fear he should be guilty." 92
So~ too, had Montesquieu, the oracle of the founding fathers, 93
?.-nd Jeremy Bentham; although Montesquieu had added a nullifying qualification. Montesquieu in his L'Esprit des Lois (1748)
in• chapter entitled, "Of Indiscreet Speeches," had written:

a

"Words do not constitute an overt act.... Words carried into action assume the nature of that action. Thus a man who
goes into a 'public market-place to incite the subject to revolt,
incurs the guilt of high treason, because the words are
joined to the action, and partake of its nature. It is not the
words that are punished, but an action in which words are
employed. They do not become criminal, but when they are
annexed to a criminal action: everything is confounded, if
'tvords are construed into a capital crime, instead of considering them only as a mark of that crime." 94

92 LETIERs TO THE HONOURABLE MR. jusr1CE BLACKSTONE 53.55 (1770).
93 Of him Madison wrote, in discussing the idea of the separation of

powers: "The
-oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu."
!!"HE FEDERALisr,-No. 47, Lodge ed., 300 (1923).
94 Bk. 12, c. 12.
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Bentham in his A Fragment on Government (1776), which_
was a criticism of Blackstone's exposition in his Commentaries on
the nature of sovereignty, in explaining the difference betweer:(
a free and a despotic government, stated that one of the distinguishing circumstances lay in "the security with which mal¥
contents may communicate their sentiments, concert their plans,.
and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt;,
before the executive power can be legally justified in disturbing
them." 95
But Montesquieu's exception for the advocacy of violenc~
blurs the workable distinction between speech and criminal deeds,.
with the double result that the exception not only is difficult'
of application but also provides the basis for stultifying restric~
tions on speech. A striking idea is just as moving to action whether.
stated philosophically in a seminar or shouted from the rostrum:,
As Justice Holmes admitted in his dissenting opinion in Gitlow._
v. New York, 96 "Every idea is an incitement." 97 Besides, in MarkAnthony fashion, the advocacy of an immediate resort to violence
may be couched in peaceful and submissive terms. Jefferson and
Madison were wise enough not to follow Montesquieu's excep~ion ..
The Court, however, in the application of Justice Holmes:,
clear and present danger test, did make an exception under cer~
tain circumstances for the advocacy of violence. As a result the
Court found itself at the last term drawing a distinction between
the advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government .as "a
rule or principle of action," proscribed in the charge in Dennis
v. United States,98 and the advocacy of such overthrow as ~(
"necessity" and a "duty," proscribed in the charge in the Yates,.
Schneiderman and Richmond cases. The Court itself admitted
that such distinctions "are often subtle and difficult to grasp." 99.
Justice Clark found them, and rightly so, "too 'subtle and difficult
to grasp.' " 100
Jefferson's classic statement from his draft of A Bill for &.,
tablishing Religious Freedom did not go wholly unnoticed. Justice Black in his concurring and dissenting opinion in the Yates;

At p. 95, Harrison ed. (1948).
U.S. 652 (1925).
117 Id. at 673.
98 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
99 354 U.S. 326.
100 Id. at 350.
95

96 268
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Schneiderman and Richmond cases, in which Justice Douglas
ioined, quoted the latter part of it. 101 So, too, did Justice Douglas
ib. his dissenting opinion in the Dennis case.102
· The approach of Jefferson and Madison, and of Justices
Black and Douglas is a farsighted one. If prevailing social structures provide a fair measure of equal justice, opportunity and
freedom for all, speech will not overthrow them. On the other
hand, if such structures are arbitrary and unjust, the suppression
o£ speech will not save them. The measures of the czars of Russia
left nothing to be desired in the way of suppression. Y~t their
&"9Vernment came to a violent and bloody end.
Under Madison and Jefferson's and Black and Douglas' view
of the First Amendment, the advocacy of the violent overthrow
of the government and even a conspiracy to advocate its violent
overthrow would be entitled to protection. Under this view the
Dennis case was wrongly decided. The advocacy provisions of
Title I of the Alien Registration Act, 1940,1°3 a title commonly
known as the Smith Act after its principal draftsman, Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia, under which over 130 leaders of the American Communist Party have been indicted and
more than 100 have been convicted and sentenced to prison
terms,104 violate the First Amendment. A fortiori, so does the

101 Id. at 340.
102 341 U.S. 494

at 590. Cf. the statement of Chief Justice Warren in his concurring
Qpinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 495 (1957): "The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a ,book or picture." And his statement
in .his dissenting opinion in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 at 446 (1957):
..It is the conduct of the individual that should be judged, not the quality of art or
literature."
103 See note 14 supra.
104 When these cases reached the Supreme Court they fared indifferently. The first
three judgments of conviction under the advocacy provisions which came to the Court
were sustained. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), affirming (2d Cir. 1950) 183
F. (2d) 201; Frankfeld v. United States, (4th Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 679, affirming (D.C. Md.
1951) 101 F. Supp. 449, cer!. den. 344 U.S. 922 (1953); United States v. Flynn, (2d Cir.
1954) 216 F. (2d) 354, cert. den. 348 U.S. 909 (1955). But the next three were reversed.
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), reversing (3d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 449,
affirming (W.D. Pa. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 345; Yates v. United States, Schneiderman v.
United States, Richmond v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), reversing (9th Cir. 1955)
225 F. (2d) 146; Wellman v. United States, 354 U.S. 931 (1957), vacating judgment in
(6th Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 757. The two membership cases before the Court were docketed
for reargument at the 1957 term and then reversed. See note 15 supra. Smith Act conspiracy
convictions against American Communists were also pending for review or reconsideration
in the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.
Th05C in the Second, Third and Tenth Circuits have resulted in reversals. United States
v~ Silverman, (2d Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 671, pet. for cert. filed, 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 3178
~o. 643); Bary v. United States, (10th Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 201; United States v. Kuzma,
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membership provision of the Smith Act. To date, however, at
least as to the advocacy provisions, the law has developed to
the contrary.

Picketing
As a further result of failing to apply the workable distinction between speech and conduct the Court in picketing cases
made an error in the opposite direction to that in the Smith Act
cases: it treated conduct-for picketing is conduct-as protected
under certain circumstances by the First Amendment, since it
also involved speech. But picketing, even if peaceful, constitutes
more than speech, as the Court itself recognized at the last term
in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc. 105 Justice Frankfurter in the Court's opinion quoted with approval
this language from the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas
in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl: 106 "Picketing by an organized
group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a
particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line
may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of
the nature of the ideas that are being disseminated." 107 Picket
lines involve a concert of action in the same fashion as do combinations in restraint of trade or to fix prices. Their primary
purpose is not the dissemination of ideas but to bring about
certain action on the part of employers. It takes considerable
courage in today's world for many people to cross a picket line.
There are valid reasons for the protection of peaceful picketing,
but it is submitted that the First, or the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments, are not among them. To base the protection of
peaceful picketing on the First Amendment not only confuses
the issues that are involved in the controversies between employers and employees, but also blurs the distinction that should be
drawn between speech and conduct. Because of such confusion
the Court in the last two decades in picketing cases, from Senn
v. Tile Layers Union 108 to International Brotherhood of Team(3d Cir. 1957) 26 U.S. LAw WEEK 2240 (Nov. 13, 1957). In the Silverman case, the court
directed the dismissal of the indictment. In the Dennis, Frankfeld and Flynn cases a total
-0f 28 defendants served prison terms.
10:; 354
106 315
101 354
10s 301

U.S. 284 (1957).
U.S. 769 at 776 (1942).
U.S. at 289.
U.S. 468 (1937).
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sters v. Vogt, Inc.,1° 9 has, to use the language of Justice Douglas in
his dissenting opinion in the latter case, "come full circle."110
The confusion began in Thornhill v. Alabama,111 where the
Court in an opinion by Justice Murphy identified peaceful
picketing with freedom of speech and stated broadly: "In the
circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution. "112 Previously the Court had ruled, in Truax v. Corrigan,113
a five-to-four decision, with the Court's opinion by Chief Justice
Taft, that an Arizona statute for the protection of peaceful picketing violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 114 another
five-to-four decision, with Justice Brandeis ·writing the Court's
opinion, that a comparable Wisconsin statute did not fall afoul
either of that or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the Thornhill case the Court in American Federation
of Labor v. Swing115 held an injunction against peaceful organizational picketing, based on Illinois' common law policy against
picketing, to be unconstitutional, saying: "The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in
his employ." 116 But in the Vogt case at the last term the Court
reached the opposite result with reference to another comparable
Wisconsin statute. As Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion in the latter case, the "factual record" in the Swing
case cannot be distinguished from that in the Vogt case. 117 In
both cases the Court's opinion was by Justice Frankfurter.
What happened was that the Court began to retreat from the
Thornhill and Swing opinions at the very next term after the
latter decision. In Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe 118 the Court
held that Texas could enjoin as a violation of its antitrust law
picketing by unions of a restaurant to bring pressure on its owner
109 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
110 Id. at 295.
111 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
112 Id. at 102.
113 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
114 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
115 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
116 Id. at 326.
117 354 U.S. 284 at 295-296.
11s 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
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with respect to the use of non-union labor by a contractor of
the restaurant owner in the construction of a building having
nothing to do with the restaurant. There followed in rather rapid
succession, among others, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,119
Teamsters Union v. Hanke 120 and Plumbers Union v. Graham. 121
In the Giboney case the Court held that Missouri could enjoin
picketing by a union, seeking to organize peddlers, of a wholesale dealer to induce it to refrain from selling to nonunion peddlers. In the Hanke case the Court decided that the State of Washington could enjoin the picketing of a business, conducted by the
owners themselves without employees, in order to secure compliance with a demand to become a union shop. In the Graham
case it held that Virginia could enjoin, as a violation of its right
to work law, picketing which announced that nonunion men
were employed on a building job. Then came the Vogt case.
Justice Douglas stated in his dissenting opinion: "Today, the
Court signs the formal surrender. State courts and state legislatures cannot fashion blanket prohibitions on all picketing. But,
for practical purposes, the situation now is as it was when Senn v.
Tile Layers Union ... was decided. State courts and state legislatures are free to decide whether to permit or suppress any
particular picket line for any reason other than a blanket policy
against all picketing." 122 This is as the law ought to be. Much of
the intermediate confusion could have been avoided had the
First Amendment through the Fourteenth not been made the
basis for the decisions in the Thornhill and Swing cases.123

Early State Power
In addition to blurring the distinction between speech and
conduct by restricting the limits of the First Amendment in the
field of speech by the application of Justice Holmes' clear and
110 336
120 339
121 345
122 354

U.S. 490 (1949).
U.S. 470 (1950).
U.S. 192 (1953).
U.S. 284 at 297.
.
123 For discussions pro and con on the point see Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech,"
56 HARv. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent," 56 HARV.
L. REV. 513 (1943); Teller, "Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply," 56 HARV. L. REv. 532
(1943); Jaffe, "In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine," 41 MICH. L. REV.
1037 (1943). See also FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1949) ("Picketing
is indeed a hybrid, comprising elements of persuasion, information, and publicity .together with elements of non-verbal conduct, economic pressure and signals for action.").
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present danger test, on the one hand, and extending it to include
certain conduct in the picketing cases, on the other, the Court
complicated the free speech picture still further by holding at
the last term in four of a series of five cases that so-called obscene
utterances did not fall within the protection of the First Amendment at all. 12-1 The basis for such an interpretation was this: "The
guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States
which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute
protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided
for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either
blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes."125
But the difficulty with the Court's stand is that the framers
. of the First Amendment, as their opposition to the Sedition Act
of 1798 emphasized, intended the states to have certain powers
over speech which they expressly sought to deny to the federal
government. Specifically they took the position that the states
and not the federal government had jurisdiction. over the offense
of seditious libel. They would have taken the same position with
reference to the offenses of blasphemy and profanity, and, later
still, obscenity-the first reported decision in this country sustaining a conviction for obscenity did not occur until 1815,126

124 Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Adams Newark Theater Co. v. Newark, 354 U.S.
931 (1957).
125 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 482 (1957).
126 Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 91 (1815). As late as 1795 an edition
of Hawkins read: "And it seems, that a writing full of obscene ribaldry, without any
kind of reflection upon any one, is not punishable at all by any prosecution at common
Jaw, as I have heard agreed in the court of king's bench . . . ." 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN, Leach ed., 130. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 at 508 (1957) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas); GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL
R.EsTRAINTS 99 (1956); Alpert, "Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature," 52 HARV. L.
REv. 40 at 47 (1938); Grant and Angoff, "Massachusetts and Censorship," 10 BoST. UNIV.
L. REv. 36 at 52 (1930); Lockhart and McClure, "Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and
the Constitution," 38 MINN. L. REV. 295 at 324, n. 200 (1954); note, 52 MICH. L. REv.
575 at 576 (1954).
Likewise the first state legislation on the subject did not -begin to appear until 1821.
Conn. Stat. Laws 165 (1821).
But the Court in the Roth case stated: "At the time of the adoption of the First
Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is sufficiently
contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection intended
for speech and press." 354 U.S. 476 at 483 (1957). In support of this statement the Court
cited the Sharpless case, supra, and Knowles v. State, 3 Day (Conn.) 103 (1808), and Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821), as well as the statute of Connecticut of 1821
and one of New Jersey of 1798, among others. Knowles was charged with exhibiting an
indecent and unseemly picture "representing a horrid and unnatural monster," but on
appeal his conviction was reversed. Also, the New Jersey statute to which the Court
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more than a quarter of a century after the first Congress proposetl
the first ten amendments. A consideration of the intent of the
founders of this country with reference to state power over speech- .
will underscore the fact that they intended the federal government to have no power in this area.
First, however, some qualifying observations about the Court's
statement are in order. The ten states to which the majority
opinion refers are Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Vermont and Virginia. These reduce to nine as of the date when
the first Congress proposed the first ten amendments (September
25, 1789); for the cited constitution of one of them, Delaware,
dates from 1792.127 In the second place these state constitutional
provisions were not always in as sweeping terms as the First
Amendment. For example, the Vermont constitution of 1786
expressly identified freedom of speech and of the press with discussions of "the transactions of government." 128 In the third place these state constitutional provisions at times contained exceptions. The Pennsylvania constitution of 1790 and the Delaware constitution of 1792 had exceptions for seditious libel, that
of South Carolina of 1790 for licentiousness, and that of Maryland of 1776 for immorality. The Pennsylvania constitution of
1790 provided that in seditious libel prosecutions truth was to
be a defense and "the jury shall have a right to determine the
law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other
cases." 120 The South Carolina constitution of 1790 in providing
for religious freedom expressly stated: "That the liberty of conreferred is not in point. It prohibited stage performances ,but did not deal with obscenity.
New Jersey Laws 331-332 (Paterson, 1800). It would thus seem that the Court's statement •
is somewhat too broad.
However, an act of 1711 of the colony of Massachusetts Bay made it an offense to
write, print or publish "any Filthy Obscene or Prophane Song, Pamphlet, Libel or MockSermon, in Imitation or in Mimicking of Preaching, or any other part of Divine Worship•
• • • " Acts and Laws of Massachusetts Bay 219 at 222 (1714). On the basis of this act
the Court, in the Roth case, concluded: "Thus, profanity and obscenity were related<·
offenses." 354 U.S. 476 at 483 (1957). One will have to concede the validity of this conclusion. The attitude which excluded blasphemy from free speech guarantees would
deal similarly with obscenity when that offense developed.
127 354 U.S. 476 at
128 C. 1, §15. The

482, n. 10 (1957).
Court referred to the declaration of rights in the Vermont constitution of 1777, c. 1, §14, which did not contain this restricting identification.
120 Art. IX, §7. The Delaware constitution of 1792 contained a similar provision.
Art. I, §5.
Again, in the case of Pennsylvania, the Court referred to the declaration of rights
in an earlier constitution, that of 1776, art. 12, which again was more broadly drawn.
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i science thereby declared shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
: of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace

i or safety of this State."130 The Maryland declaration of rights of

1776 had this exception: " ... unless, under colour of religion,
· any man shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the
. State, or shall infringe the laws of morality.... " 131 By way of cont trast the First Amendment provided without qualification: "Con·. gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
· .of the press ...."
·
i
In the fourth place the states did not always observe their
., own constitutional provisions. As Madison pointed out when he
submitted his proposed amendments to the first Congress in
{ June 1789: " ... there are a few particular States in which some
; of the most valuable articles have not, at one time or other, been
. violated'...." 132

Ho~ever, the main difficulty with the Court's action in sus-

i taining ihe validity of a federal obscenity statute lies in the fact
that the· framers of the First Amendment intended that whatever governmental power existed over utterances was to reside
, in the states rather than the federal government. The proceed. ings of the first Congress on the first ten amendments show this;
'i.the opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798 stressed it; and the
· defeat of President Jackson's proposal for barring "incendiary
. publications" from the mails reaffirmed the point.
!' •
One of Madison's proposed amendments provided: "No State
; shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of
:the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."133 This proposed
amendment came from Madison alone. No state convention
asked for it. In offering it he explained: ". . . it is proper that
·.'every Government should be disarmed of powers which trench
· upon those particular rights. I know, in some of the State con~ stitutions, the power of the Government is controlled by such a
· declaration; but others are not. I cannot see any reason against

130 Art. VIII, §1.
131.Art. XXXIII. Of the remaining five there were two whose constitutions provided
that freedom of the press was to remain inviolate. GA. CONST., art. LXI (1777), art. IV,
,§3 (1789); N,H. CoNsr., art. I, §22 (1784). The :remaining three provided .that the liberty
'of the press was. not to be restrained. MASS. CoNsr., Declaration of Rights, art. XVI
;(1780); N.C. CoNsr. Declaration of Rights, art. XV (1776); VA. CoNsr., Declaration of
Rights, §12 (1776).
t
132 I ANNALS OF CONG., Gales comp., 439 (1834).
133 Id. at 435.
,
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obtaining even a double security on those points; and nothing :·
can give a more sincere proof of the attachment of those who 1
oppose this constitution to these great and important rights than :
to see them join in obtaining the security I have now proposed;
because it must be admitted, on all hands, that the State Govern- 1
ments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges as the .
General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously
guarded against." 134
The House sent Madison's proposals to a special committee '
of which he was one of the members. The special committee ,
revised this proposal to read: "No State shall infringe the equal.
rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the press, 1
nor of the right of trial by jury in criminal cases." 133
Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina objected i
to it: "This is offered, I presume, as an amendment to the con- 1
stitution of the United States, but it goes only to the alterations ,
of the constitutions of particular States. It will be much better,
I apprehend, to leave the State Governments to themselves, and
not to interfere with them more than we already do; and that
is thought by many to be rather too much. I therefore move,
sir, to strike out these words."
J
But: "MR. MADISON conceived this to be the most valuable '
amendment in the whole list. If there was any reason to restrain ·. •
the Government of the United States from infringing upon
these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should \
be secured against the State Governments. He thought that if .
they provided against the one, it was as necessary to provide :.
against the other, and was satisfied that it would be equally grate- 1
ful to the people." 136
Madison won out in the House. After a further minor re- .:.
vision this proposal went to the Senate in this form: "No State· I
shall infringe the right of trial by Jury in criminal cases, nor
the rights of conscience, nor the freedom of speech, or of the ,
press." 137 But in the Senate the position which Tucke'r took 'in
the House won out, and this proposal was rejected.
The national debate on the Sedition Act of I 798 underlined the point that the states had a certain amount of power
134 Id. at 441.
135 See id. at 755.
136 Ibid.
137

5
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193, 197 (Dept.. of State 1905).'
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over utterances which was denied the federal government. In
--Ole debates in Congress Nicholas of Virginia, Nathaniel Macon
. of North Carolina and Edward Livingston of New York all drew
a distinction between state and federal power. Nicholas: " ... He
'had heard it said that all the States take cognizance of offenses
-of this sort. But does that give the power to the General Government? Because the States declare certain things offences, have
· the General Government power over the like offences? If so,
it would have a concurrent power with all the State Governments,
. which, he believed, would be a novel idea. Indeed, he was utterly
at a loss to find any ground upon which to found a law of this
· kind. He was confident there was none." 138
Macon: " . . . He thought this subject of the liberty of the
· -press was sacred, and ought to be left where the Constitution
· had left it. The States have complete power on the subject, and
when Congress legislates, it ought to have confidence in the
States, as the States ought also to have confidence in Congress,
or our Government is gone. . . ." 139
Livingston: " ... Every man's character is protected by law,
and every man who shall publish a libel on any part of the
Government, is liable to punishment. Not, said Mr. L., by laws
. which we ourselves have made, but by laws passed by the several
States. And is not this most proper? . . .''140
·
Madison took the same position in his Address and subsequent
::Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798. In his Address he
stated: " ... But the laws for the correction of calumny were not
defective. Every libellous writing or expression might receive
. -its punishment in the State courts. . . ." 141 In his Report he
· added that libelled federal officials had to seek redress "under
, ilie same laws, and in the same tribunals, which protect their
2.:fives, their liberties, and their properties."142
A few months before his second inauguration Jefferson wrote
• , to Mrs. John (Abigail) Adams, the wife of his political opponent
•·-in the presidential campaign of 1800:
" . . . Nor does the opinion of the unconstitutionality, &
consequent nullity of that law [Sedition Act of 1798], re138 ANNALS OF CONG.
-189 Id. at 2152.

2142, 5th Cong., 2d sess. (1798).

• · 140 Id. at 2153.
1416 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, Hunt ed., 334 (1906).
il42 Id. at 393; 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

2d ed., 57!1 (1881).
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move all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of slander, which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth
and falsehood, in the U.S. The power to do that is fully
possessed by the several State Legislatures. It was reserved to
them, & was denied to the General Government, by the
Constitution, according to our construction of it. While
we deny that Congress have a right to control the freedom
of the press, we have ever asserted, the right of the States,
and their exclusive right, to do so." 143
In his second inaugural he took occasion to restate his position:
"During this course of administration and in order to disturb it, the artillery of the press has been levelled against
us, charged with whatsoever its licentiousness could devise
or dare. These abuses of an institution so important to freedom and science, are deeply to be regretted, inasmuch as
they tend to lessen its usefulness, and to sap its safety; they
might, indeed, have been corrected by the wholesome punishments reserved and provided by the laws of the several
States against falsehood and defamation; but public duties
more urgent press on the time of public servants, and the
offenders have therefore been left to find their punishment
in the public indignation."144
The defeat of President Jackson's proposal demonstrated once
again that the only power that existed over utterances, as such,
resided in the states. In the words of Clay, "The States alone
had the power, and their power was ample for the purpose." 145
There is an additional consideration: the framers of the
First Amendment, in order to make doubly certain that the
federal government did not have or exercise any powers other
than those which the Constitution either expressly or by implication delegated to it, provided in the Tenth Amendment:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Madison had originally proposed: "The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re148 Letter of Sept. 11, 1804. 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Fed. ed. by Ford,
89-90 n. (1905). A decade and a half earlier he had written Madison from Paris: " ••• A
declaration that the federal government will never restrain the presses from printing
any thing they please, will not take away the liability of the printers for false facts
printed.•••" 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Boyd ed., 440, 442 (1956).
144 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Fed. ed. by Ford, 133-134 (1905).
H5 CONG. GLOBE APP., 24th Cong., 1st sess., 439 (18!!6).
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spectively."146 As revised this became the Tenth Amendment.
An effort was twice made, once by Tucker147 and again by
Gerry, 148 to carry the idea embodied in this amendment still
further by inserting the word "expressly" before the word "delegated." This was the way it had been in the Articles of Confederation.149 Madison opposed Tucker's proposal "because it was
impossible to confine a Government to the exercise of express
powers; there must necessarily be admitted powers by implication, unless the Constitution descended to recount every minutiae. "150 Madison's view prevailed. However, in the area covered by the First Amendment the Tenth Amendment meant
that whatever power there was over utterances, as such, resided,
not in the federal government, but in the states or in the people.
Nevertheless the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court developed otherwise.
[To be concluded.]

146 1 ANNALS OF CONG., Gales comp.,
147 Id. at 761.
148 Id. at 767.
149 Art. II, quoted in note 40 supra.
150 1 ANNALS OF CONG., Gales comp.,

436 (1834).

761 (1834).

